Commit-by-commit plan — Phase 0 + Phase 1

This document is the operating plan for the first 12 weeks. Every commit that is intended to land in dev (and from there in main via PR) is listed here with: subject, owning agent (role number from 03-team.md), files touched, the test that must pass, the DoD, and dependencies on prior commits.

Phase 0 (weeks 1–2) is exhaustively listed. Phase 1 (weeks 3–12) is listed sprint-by-sprint, with the anchor commits per sprint enumerated; smaller iterative commits are described as a class with a counter.

Phase 2–4 commits are sketched at milestone level only and will be expanded sprint-by-sprint at the start of each phase.

---

Commit format (binding rules)

Subject: ≤ 72 characters. Imperative mood. No prefix (feat:, fix:, etc.). No emoji.

Examples that pass:

• remove demo bypass from proof-pairing submitProof
• add hash chain to audit_events insert path
• ship Anchor Bank dashboard users view

Examples that fail:

• feat: remove demo bypass ❌ (Conventional Commits prefix)
• Remove demo bypass. ❌ (full stop, not imperative)
• WIP: chain ❌ (WIP)
• [fix] check tenant ❌ (bracket prefix)
• Update audit chain ❌ (emoji)

Body: one to three short paragraphs. Explain why, not what. Reference the audit-finding ID or pain-point ID where applicable. Reference the test file by path. No screenshots, no logs.

Trailers: none. No Co-Authored-By: Claude. No Signed-off-by: unless the user explicitly requests it. The author/committer is the human or agent doing the work.

One commit ≈ one reviewable change. A commit that changes 12 files in unrelated areas is rejected at review.

---

Pre-commit hook (mandatory, week 1 deliverable)

Lives at .husky/pre-commit. Blocks the commit if any of:

1. tsc --noEmit errors.
2. eslint reports any error (warnings allowed).
3. jest --findRelatedTests <staged files> reports any failure.
4. Staged content contains any of: BEGIN PRIVATE KEY, JWT_SECRET=, SESSION_SECRET=, ADMIN_API_KEY=, BLOCKCHAIN_PRIVATE_KEY=, za_live_[0-9a-f]{48}, za_test_[0-9a-f]{48}, the literal Co-Authored-By: Claude.
5. Staged content contains any biometric-payload key: image|template|pixel|depth|frame|raw_face|raw_finger in an Express handler.
6. New circuit version detected (changed *.zkey file > 50 KB) without a matching ADR in /adr/.
7. New dependency detected in package.json without a matching ADR.

Override: git commit --no-verify is explicitly disallowed. Pre-commit hook is also re-run in CI to catch override attempts.

---

Phase 0 — Remediation (weeks 1–2)

Phase 0 closes the 21 audit findings (P0 first), removes the demo bypass, lays the hash-chain foundation, and brings the codebase to a state where Phase 1 can build on a clean slate.

Week 1

C-001 add pre-commit hook with secret + tsc + eslint + jest gates

• Owner: Role 22.
• Files: .husky/pre-commit, package.json, scripts/pre-commit-checks.sh.
• Test: scripts/test-pre-commit.sh — exits 0 on clean staging; exits non-zero on each of the 7 violation patterns above.
• DoD: hook installed in dev environment; CI replicates the same checks in .github/workflows/ci.yml step pre-commit-mirror.
• Depends on: nothing.

C-002 add ADR 0008 for dev+main branching workflow

• Owner: Role 1.
• Files: adr/0008-branching-workflow.md.
• Test: [no-test] — ADR is documentation; CI lints the file with markdownlint.
• DoD: ADR captures dev + main only, PR from dev → main, no feature branches; referenced from CLAUDE.md.
• Depends on: C-001.

C-003 add tests/schema-purity.test.ts asserting no-PII in users

• Owner: Role 23.
• Files: tests/schema-purity.test.ts.
• Test: itself — fails on red (current schema if any PII columns), passes on green.
• DoD: enumerates the allowed users columns explicitly; fails fast if any column not in the allowlist exists in any environment.
• Depends on: C-001.

C-004 remove demo bypass from proof-pairing submitProof

• Owner: Role 6.
• Files: src/services/proof-pairing.ts, tests/proof-pairing.test.ts.
• Test: tests/proof-pairing.test.ts::"rejects did:zeroauth:demo:* even with otherwise valid payload".
• DoD: submitProof no longer accepts did:zeroauth:demo:* without a verified Groth16 proof against the deployed verification key; closes P0 audit finding C-1; threat-model row A-12 updated.
• Depends on: C-001, C-003.

C-005 remove access_token query fallback from console SSE auth

• Owner: Role 7.
• Files: src/middleware/tenant-auth.ts, src/routes/console.ts, tests/console-auth.test.ts.
• DoD: SSE auth now uses HttpOnly cookie + CSRF token; ?access_token= query parameter rejected with unauthorized; closes P0 audit finding C-3; access logs no longer contain token-in-URL.
• Test: tests/console-auth.test.ts::"SSE rejects access_token in query string".
• Depends on: C-001.

C-006 migrate dashboard EventSource to credentials include + CSRF

• Owner: Role 14.
• Files: dashboard/src/lib/api.ts, dashboard/src/routes/demo/QrProofLogin.tsx, dashboard/src/lib/sse.ts (new).
• Test: dashboard/src/lib/__tests__/sse.test.ts — asserts EventSource opened with withCredentials: true, no ?access_token= in URL.
• DoD: dashboard SSE works end-to-end against the new cookie-based auth; QR demo flow still authenticates.
• Depends on: C-005.

C-007 add tests/tenant-isolation.test.ts cross-tenant rejection matrix

• Owner: Role 23.
• Files: tests/tenant-isolation.test.ts.
• Test: itself — every /v1/* endpoint exercised with a wrong-tenant API key returns 403 tenant_mismatch.
• DoD: the test enumerates all currently mounted /v1/* routes via Express router introspection; every route is tested; no manual list.
• Depends on: C-001.

C-008 add ADR 0009 for QR proof pairing protocol (Option B-prime)

• Owner: Role 11.
• Files: adr/0009-qr-proof-pairing-protocol.md.
• Test: [no-test] — markdown-lint.
• DoD: ADR captures the Option B′ protocol: didHashSession = Poseidon(2)([storedDidHash, sessionNonce]); threat-model row A-23 (replay) cross-referenced.
• Depends on: nothing.

C-009 add ADR 0010 for audit hash chain construction

• Owner: Role 11.
• Files: adr/0010-audit-log-hash-chain.md.
• Test: [no-test] — markdown-lint.
• DoD: ADR defines hash function (SHA-256 over canonical JSON), chain entry shape (previous_hash, event_hash), genesis row, drift-detection cadence; threat-model row A-14 updated.
• Depends on: nothing.

C-010 add ADR 0011 for daily on-chain anchor cadence on Base L2

• Owner: Role 25.
• Files: adr/0011-on-chain-anchor-cadence.md.
• Test: [no-test] — markdown-lint.
• DoD: ADR defines audit_anchors table, the cron schedule (00:30 IST), the anchor payload ({tenant_id, day, terminal_hash}), the contract method, failure recovery.
• Depends on: C-009.

C-011 add audit_events.previous_hash and event_hash columns

• Owner: Role 8.
• Files: src/services/db.ts, tests/audit-schema.test.ts.
• Test: tests/audit-schema.test.ts::"audit_events has previous_hash and event_hash columns".
• DoD: schema bootstrap idempotent; existing rows backfilled with NULL previous_hash; new rows compute event_hash.
• Depends on: C-009.

C-012 implement append-only audit chain in src/services/audit.ts

• Owner: Role 8 (with Role 13 review).
• Files: src/services/audit.ts (new), src/services/platform.ts, tests/audit-chain.test.ts.
• Test: tests/audit-chain.test.ts — appends 100 rows, computes chain, tampers row 50, integrity check fails at row 50.
• DoD: appendAuditEvent is the only function callers use; direct INSERT INTO audit_events blocked by lint rule; cryptographer-reviewer subagent signs off.
• Depends on: C-011.

C-013 route all platform.ts audit writes through audit.ts appendAuditEvent

• Owner: Role 8.
• Files: src/services/platform.ts, src/routes/admin.ts, src/routes/console.ts, src/routes/v1/*.ts.
• Test: tests/audit-chain.test.ts::"every audit-writing surface uses appendAuditEvent" — grep-style test reading source.
• DoD: zero direct INSERT into audit_events in production code; every audit row written through appendAuditEvent.
• Depends on: C-012.

C-014 add /api/admin/audit-integrity endpoint

• Owner: Role 9.
• Files: src/routes/admin.ts, src/services/audit.ts, tests/admin-audit-integrity.test.ts.
• Test: tests/admin-audit-integrity.test.ts::"returns PASS for clean chain", "returns FAIL with broken_at row id".
• DoD: endpoint returns {status, broken_at?}; gated by x-api-key; logs an audit row of its own.
• Depends on: C-013.

C-015 add CronCreate-managed daily on-chain anchor job

• Owner: Role 21 (with Role 25).
• Files: src/services/anchor-job.ts (new), src/services/blockchain.ts, tests/anchor-job.test.ts.
• Test: tests/anchor-job.test.ts::"computes terminal hash and submits to AuditAnchor contract" against Hardhat fork.
• DoD: cron registered, runs at 00:30 IST, writes audit_anchors row on success, logs alert on failure.
• Depends on: C-014.

C-016 add AuditAnchor contract on Base Sepolia

• Owner: Role 25.
• Files: contracts/AuditAnchor.sol, scripts/deploy-contracts.ts, contracts/deployed-addresses.json.
• Test: contracts/test/AuditAnchor.test.ts (Hardhat).
• DoD: deployed and verified on Basescan; addresses committed to deployed-addresses.json; ABI exported.
• Depends on: C-010.

C-017 update threat_model.md for hash chain and on-chain anchor

• Owner: Role 35.
• Files: docs/threat_model.md.
• Test: [no-test] — markdownlint.
• DoD: A-14 (audit-log tampering) marked as mitigated; A-22 (compromised DBA) added; references C-012 + C-016.
• Depends on: C-016.

Week 2

C-018 lock circuit version to identity_proof.v1.1 in src/services/zkp.ts

• Owner: Role 11.
• Files: src/services/zkp.ts, tests/zkp-version.test.ts.
• Test: tests/zkp-version.test.ts::"loads identity_proof v1.1 verification_key".
• DoD: version constant exported; mismatch between vkey hash and constant throws on boot; closes P0 audit finding C-7.
• Depends on: C-001.

C-019 add ADR 0012 for circuit version pinning + upgrade procedure

• Owner: Role 11.
• Files: adr/0012-circuit-version-pinning.md.
• Test: [no-test] — markdownlint.
• DoD: defines the version constant, the vkey hash check, the new-version landing procedure (ADR + ceremony transcript + verifier deploy).
• Depends on: C-018.

C-020 redeploy Groth16Verifier to Base Sepolia at v1.1 vkey

• Owner: Role 25.
• Files: contracts/Groth16Verifier.sol, scripts/deploy-contracts.ts, contracts/deployed-addresses.json.
• Test: contracts/test/Groth16Verifier.test.ts against deployed contract.
• DoD: deployed, verified on Basescan, addresses committed; verifier accepts one known-good proof, rejects one known-bad.
• Depends on: C-018.

C-021 add tests/biometric-rejection.test.ts blocking payload keys

• Owner: Role 23.
• Files: tests/biometric-rejection.test.ts.
• Test: itself — every /v1/* POST endpoint rejects payloads containing image|template|pixel|depth|frame|raw_face|raw_finger.
• DoD: enumerated POST routes via Express introspection; test class for each forbidden key.
• Depends on: C-007.

C-022 add zod input validators on /v1/identity/register and /v1/zkp/verify

• Owner: Role 6.
• Files: src/validators/identity.ts (new), src/validators/zkp.ts (new), src/routes/v1/identity.ts, src/routes/v1/zkp.ts, tests/validator-identity.test.ts, tests/validator-zkp.test.ts.
• Test: validators reject malformed payloads with invalid_input; biometric-key blocklist enforced.
• DoD: zod is a new dep — ADR 0013 lands in C-023.
• Depends on: C-021.

C-023 add ADR 0013 for zod adoption + dependency rationale

• Owner: Role 6.
• Files: adr/0013-zod-input-validation.md, package.json, package-lock.json.
• Test: scripts/check-dep-trail.sh passes.
• DoD: zod pinned to a SemVer-fixed version; ADR captures alternatives (joi, ajv, hand-rolled); supply-chain check from npm audit clean.
• Depends on: C-022.

C-024 add /api/admin/dump-users for breach-sim demo (read-only, allowlisted)

• Owner: Role 9.
• Files: src/routes/admin.ts, tests/admin-dump-users.test.ts.
• Test: tests/admin-dump-users.test.ts::"only returns DID + commitment + tenant_id + created_at".
• DoD: endpoint serves the demo scene 4; output strictly the four allowed columns; gated by x-api-key + tenant demo_breach_view_allowed flag.
• Depends on: C-003.

C-025 migrate session-store from in-memory to Postgres-backed

• Owner: Role 7.
• Files: src/services/session-store.ts, src/services/db.ts, tests/session-store-pg.test.ts.
• Test: tests/session-store-pg.test.ts::"sessions persist across process restart".
• DoD: Postgres-backed by default; in-memory still available behind SESSION_STORE_BACKEND=memory env for dev; closes P0 audit finding C-9.
• Depends on: C-001.

C-026 add rate-limit table + middleware backed by Postgres

• Owner: Role 7.
• Files: src/middleware/rate-limit.ts, src/services/db.ts, tests/rate-limit.test.ts.
• Test: tests/rate-limit.test.ts::"second 11th request within window returns 429".
• DoD: rate-limit per (api_key_hash, route) and per (ip, route) with configurable buckets; closes P0 audit finding C-10.
• Depends on: C-025.

C-027 harden CORS to explicit origin allowlist per tenant

• Owner: Role 7.
• Files: src/middleware/cors.ts (new), src/app.ts, tests/cors.test.ts.
• Test: tests/cors.test.ts::"rejects un-allowlisted Origin".
• DoD: each tenant has allowed_origins; wildcard explicitly disallowed in live env.
• Depends on: C-001.

C-028 JWT migrate to RS256 with key rotation; publish JWKS

• Owner: Role 12.
• Files: src/services/jwt.ts, src/routes/.well-known/jwks.ts (new), tests/jwt-rs256.test.ts.
• Test: tests/jwt-rs256.test.ts::"validates RS256 token against JWKS".
• DoD: keys generated, JWKS endpoint live, rotation playbook documented; closes P0 audit finding C-11.
• Depends on: C-023.

C-029 expand security-reviewer subagent invocation hooks

• Owner: Role 26.
• Files: .claude/agents/security-reviewer.md, .husky/post-commit, scripts/invoke-sec-reviewer.sh.
• Test: scripts/test-sec-reviewer-hook.sh — touches a sensitive path, verifies subagent is invoked.
• DoD: every PR touching auth/crypto/tenant paths gets a subagent review row in the PR thread.
• Depends on: C-001.

C-030 expand cryptographer-reviewer subagent invocation hooks

• Owner: Role 27.
• Files: .claude/agents/cryptographer-reviewer.md, scripts/invoke-crypto-reviewer.sh.
• Test: scripts/test-crypto-reviewer-hook.sh.
• DoD: every PR touching circuits/, contracts/, src/services/zkp.ts, src/services/identity.ts, or any new hash construction gets a subagent review.
• Depends on: C-001.

C-031 add docs/security/audit-findings.md tracking all 21 findings

• Owner: Role 26.
• Files: docs/security/audit-findings.md.
• Test: [no-test] — markdownlint.
• DoD: table of all 21 findings with status (open, closed-by-<commit-hash>, accepted-risk); CI step asserts closed-by- rows have a real commit hash.
• Depends on: C-029.

C-032 add nightly CVE monitor with email alerts

• Owner: Role 22.
• Files: .github/workflows/cve-monitor.yml, scripts/cve-monitor.sh.
• Test: workflow dry-run on a known-vulnerable lockfile asserts alert is fired.
• DoD: workflow runs nightly; alerts go to security-engineer email + Slack.
• Depends on: C-001.

C-033 update CLAUDE.md with phase-0 final state references

• Owner: Role 1.
• Files: CLAUDE.md.
• Test: [no-test] — markdownlint.
• DoD: references docs/plan/bfsi-v1/00-README.md; lists the closed P0 findings; updates LAST_UPDATED.
• Depends on: all of week 1 + week 2.

Phase 0 exit gate (end of week 2):

• All P0 findings closed (C-1 via C-004, C-3 via C-005/C-006, C-7 via C-018, C-9 via C-025, C-10 via C-026, C-11 via C-028, plus C-2 below).
• tests/ suite green.
• Pre-commit hook live in dev + mirrored in CI.
• All ADRs landed: 0008–0013.
• Threat model updated.
• Audit findings document live with status per row.

Note: C-2 finding (fake biometric / fake prover) is not closeable in Phase 0; it requires the mobile work in Phase 1. We mark C-2 as tracked-to-phase-1-sprint-3 in docs/security/audit-findings.md.

---

Phase 1 — Pramaan v1 + Bank Demo (weeks 3–12)

Each sprint is 2 weeks. Five sprints total.

Sprint 1 (weeks 3–4) — Real identity register + mobile skeleton

Theme: Replace the demo identity-register path with a production-quality endpoint that validates Play Integrity verdicts and StrongBox key attestation. Bootstrap the Android repo and the rapidsnark JNI bridge proof-of-concept.

Anchor commits:

C-101 bootstrap mobile/ subtree with Android Studio project

• Owner: Role 17.
• Files: mobile/ (new tree), mobile/.gitignore, mobile/README.md, mobile/build.gradle.kts, mobile/app/build.gradle.kts, mobile/app/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml.
• Test: mobile/gradlew assembleDebug produces an APK; CI runs the build.
• DoD: minSdk 30, targetSdk 34, Kotlin 1.9, Jetpack Compose, Gradle 8.x; structured per Android best practices.
• Depends on: C-033.

C-102 add ADR 0014 for android-only mobile platform decision

• Owner: Role 4.
• Files: adr/0014-android-only-mobile-platform.md.
• Test: [no-test] — markdownlint.
• DoD: captures the iOS deferral, the rationale (BFSI Android share ≥ 95 %, StrongBox availability, USB-OTG availability for R307), the v2 re-evaluation criteria.
• Depends on: C-101.

C-103 add ADR 0015 for rapidsnark JNI vs WebView prover

• Owner: Role 11.
• Files: adr/0015-rapidsnark-jni-prover.md.
• Test: [no-test] — markdownlint.
• DoD: WebView prover OK for phase 1 spike; rapidsnark JNI is the production target; toolchain pinned.
• Depends on: C-102.

C-104 add rapidsnark JNI bridge proof-of-concept

• Owner: Role 17.
• Files: mobile/prover/, mobile/prover/src/main/cpp/, mobile/prover/src/main/kotlin/.
• Test: mobile/prover/src/androidTest/java/.../ProverSmokeTest.kt::"generates a valid proof against fixed witness".
• DoD: rapidsnark integrated as a static library via CMake; JNI wrapper exposes generateProof(witnessJson) -> proofJson; smoke test passes on a Pixel emulator.
• Depends on: C-103.

C-105 redesign /v1/identity/register for Play Integrity + StrongBox attestation

• Owner: Role 6.
• Files: src/routes/v1/identity.ts, src/services/identity.ts, src/services/attestation.ts (new), src/validators/identity.ts, tests/identity-register.test.ts.
• Test: tests/identity-register.test.ts::"rejects request without valid Play Integrity verdict", "rejects request without valid StrongBox attestation chain".
• DoD: endpoint accepts {did, commitment, play_integrity_verdict, key_attestation_chain, attestation_signature}; validates both attestations; closes P0 finding C-2 partially (server-side; mobile in C-201–C-205); writes audit row.
• Depends on: C-022, C-104.

C-106 add ADR 0016 for Play Integrity verdict acceptance criteria

• Owner: Role 27 (with Role 6).
• Files: adr/0016-play-integrity-acceptance.md.
• Test: [no-test] — markdownlint.
• DoD: defines MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY + MEETS_BASIC_INTEGRITY + StrongBox required for live env; MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY strict for high-value flows; nonce binding rules.
• Depends on: C-105.

C-107 dashboard users view shows only allowed columns

• Owner: Role 14.
• Files: dashboard/src/routes/tenant/users.tsx, dashboard/src/lib/api.ts, dashboard/src/components/UsersTable.tsx.
• Test: dashboard/src/routes/tenant/__tests__/users.test.tsx::"never renders an email or name field".
• DoD: column allowlist enforced in component; Playwright check in CI.
• Depends on: C-024.

C-108 add demo bank tenant anchor_bank in test environment

• Owner: Role 7.
• Files: scripts/seed-demo-tenants.ts, tests/seed-demo-tenants.test.ts.
• Test: tests/seed-demo-tenants.test.ts::"anchor_bank tenant provisioned with right scopes".
• DoD: script idempotent; tenant has live + test envs; webhooks configured; API keys generated and printed to operator (not committed).
• Depends on: C-105.

Plus ~12 smaller commits (C-109 .. C-120) covering: cleanup of legacy demo paths in dashboard, smaller test fixes, schema migrations, docs updates, two minor frontend polish PRs.

Sprint 1 exit gate:

• /v1/identity/register running with attestation validation in test env.
• Android repo scaffolded with prover smoke test green.
• Dashboard users view PII-free.
• Anchor Bank tenant seeded in test.

Sprint 2 (weeks 5–6) — Hash chain shipped + audit dashboard + tenant hardening

Theme: Operationalise the hash chain in production (test env first, live second), ship the audit-integrity view in the dashboard, harden tenant boundary tests, finalise schema migrations.

Anchor commits:

C-121 ship hash chain backfill migration for existing audit_events

• Owner: Role 8.
• Files: scripts/migrations/0001-audit-hash-chain-backfill.ts, tests/migrations/audit-backfill.test.ts.
• Test: backfill 10 k rows; verify chain holds; idempotent.
• DoD: migration runnable on test and live; rollback path documented; verified on staging dump.
• Depends on: C-012.

C-122 enable audit hash chain enforcement in test env

• Owner: Role 8.
• Files: src/config/feature-flags.ts, src/services/audit.ts.
• Test: tests/audit-chain-prod.test.ts::"appends with non-null previous_hash in test env".
• DoD: feature flag AUDIT_HASH_CHAIN_ENFORCED=true in test; alerts wired.
• Depends on: C-121.

C-123 add audit-integrity dashboard view with on-chain anchor link

• Owner: Role 14.
• Files: dashboard/src/routes/tenant/audit-integrity.tsx, dashboard/src/components/IntegrityCheckCard.tsx.
• Test: dashboard/src/routes/tenant/__tests__/audit-integrity.test.tsx::"renders PASS state and FAIL state".
• DoD: view shows last integrity check result, last anchor tx hash with Basescan link, integrity-check-now button.
• Depends on: C-014, C-016.

C-124 add audit-anchors dashboard sub-view

• Owner: Role 14.
• Files: dashboard/src/routes/tenant/audit-anchors.tsx.
• Test: dashboard/src/routes/tenant/__tests__/audit-anchors.test.tsx.
• DoD: table of recent anchors, with day, terminal hash, Basescan tx hash, status.
• Depends on: C-015, C-123.

C-125 add Anchor Bank webhook receiver smoke test

• Owner: Role 23 (with Role 10).
• Files: tests/webhook-anchor-bank.test.ts, scripts/mock-webhook-receiver.ts.
• Test: mock receiver receives user.enrolled event, verifies HMAC signature, returns 200.
• DoD: webhook signing key rotation tested; replay protection (nonce + 5-min window) verified.
• Depends on: C-108.

C-126 expand cross-tenant rejection test to /api/console/* + /api/admin/*

• Owner: Role 23.
• Files: tests/tenant-isolation.test.ts.
• Test: extended matrix; every console + admin endpoint exercised cross-tenant.
• DoD: 100 % route coverage by Express introspection; no manual list.
• Depends on: C-007.

C-127 add tests/audit-coverage.test.ts asserting every write surface logs

• Owner: Role 23.
• Files: tests/audit-coverage.test.ts.
• Test: enumerates every mutating endpoint via Express + grep; asserts each writes an audit row.
• DoD: any new mutating endpoint without an audit row breaks the build.
• Depends on: C-013.

C-128 add docs/operations/audit-integrity-runbook.md

• Owner: Role 35.
• Files: docs/operations/audit-integrity-runbook.md.
• Test: [no-test] — markdownlint.
• DoD: on-call runbook for "audit integrity check failed" + "on-chain anchor failed two days running".
• Depends on: C-123, C-124.

Plus ~14 smaller commits (C-129 .. C-142) covering: more cross-tenant test coverage, dashboard polish, observability dashboards (verifier latency, audit-write lag, anchor lag), CVE-monitor alert tuning, eslint rule additions, ADR-0017 (Postgres-backed rate-limit alternatives evaluated and discarded).

Sprint 2 exit gate:

• Hash chain enforced in test; nightly CI verifies integrity.
• On-chain anchors landing daily on Base Sepolia.
• Dashboard audit-integrity view live.
• Cross-tenant test coverage expanded.

Sprint 3 (weeks 7–8) — Mobile prover end-to-end + Scene 2

Theme: Bring the Android prover to feature-completeness for Scene 2 (login). End-to-end: app scans QR, fires BiometricPrompt, generates real Groth16 proof, server verifies. This is where C-2 (fake-prover) audit finding closes.

Anchor commits:

C-143 mobile enrollment flow with CameraX face capture

• Owner: Role 17 + Role 19.
• Files: mobile/app/src/main/kotlin/dev/zeroauth/enrollment/, mobile/app/src/main/res/, mobile/app/src/androidTest/.../EnrollmentInstrumentedTest.kt.
• Test: instrumented test on emulator simulates face capture, asserts SHA-256 of descriptor computed on-device, asserts buffer GC'd within 1 s.
• DoD: face capture flow runs on Pixel 7 + emulator; capture cancel + retry tested.
• Depends on: C-101.

C-144 mobile BiometricPrompt integration + StrongBox key wrap

• Owner: Role 17.
• Files: mobile/app/src/main/kotlin/dev/zeroauth/keystore/, instrumented tests.
• Test: instrumented test asserts: key created with setIsStrongBoxBacked(true); key inaccessible without fresh BiometricPrompt assertion.
• DoD: tested on Pixel 7 (StrongBox-capable); fallback path for non-StrongBox devices documented.
• Depends on: C-143.

C-145 mobile QR scanner + session_nonce + tenant_id binding

• Owner: Role 19.
• Files: mobile/app/src/main/kotlin/dev/zeroauth/scanner/.
• Test: instrumented test scans a generated QR, asserts session_nonce extracted, tenant_id verified against in-app config.
• DoD: ML Kit Barcode Scanning integration; QR formats v1 documented in docs/protocols/qr-pairing.md.
• Depends on: C-143.

C-146 mobile end-to-end login flow against test env

• Owner: Role 17 + Role 19.
• Files: mobile/app/src/main/kotlin/dev/zeroauth/login/, instrumented + on-device test.
• Test: on-device test on the team's CI device farm — scan QR, biometric, generate proof, post to test env, receive session.
• DoD: end-to-end login on test env works on Pixel 7 + Samsung S22 + Redmi Note 13.
• Depends on: C-104, C-144, C-145.

C-147 kiosk web app for Scene 2 with SSE consumer + QR generator

• Owner: Role 15.
• Files: dashboard/src/routes/kiosk/, dashboard/src/lib/kiosk-sse.ts.
• Test: Playwright test simulating kiosk: opens QR, posts a verify request server-side, asserts SSE event received and redirect happens.
• DoD: kiosk URL is https://zeroauth.dev/kiosk/<tenant>?session=<nonce>; latency ≤ 1 s from server verify to kiosk redirect.
• Depends on: C-006.

C-148 harden /v1/zkp/verify with full proof verification path

• Owner: Role 6.
• Files: src/routes/v1/zkp.ts, src/services/zkp.ts, tests/zkp-verify-prod.test.ts.
• Test: tests/zkp-verify-prod.test.ts::"accepts known-good proof", "rejects known-bad proof", "rejects replayed session_nonce".
• DoD: full snarkjs.groth16.verify against verification_key.json; replay protection via session-nonce dedup table; writes audit row.
• Depends on: C-020.

C-149 close P0 audit finding C-2 (real prover on mobile)

• Owner: Role 17 (signed off by Role 26 + Role 27).
• Files: docs/security/audit-findings.md, tests/no-fake-prover.test.ts.
• Test: tests/no-fake-prover.test.ts::"grep for FakeMobileProver returns zero hits".
• DoD: FakeKeystoreManager, FakeMobileProver, FakeBiometricGate removed from codebase; instrumented Pixel test passes.
• Depends on: C-146.

C-150 mobile crash + ANR telemetry pipeline (no PII)

• Owner: Role 19.
• Files: mobile/app/src/main/kotlin/dev/zeroauth/telemetry/.
• Test: instrumented test simulates crash; verifies telemetry payload contains no PII, no biometric data; verifies pipeline ships.
• DoD: telemetry endpoint receives + persists; allowlist of fields; no DID, no commitment in payload.
• Depends on: C-101.

Plus ~12 smaller commits (C-151 .. C-162) covering: server-side proof-verification audit row enrichment, kiosk UX polish, SSE reconnect logic, demo session expiry handling, dashboard "sessions live now" view, mobile UI strings + i18n stub (English + Hindi base), more device-fleet coverage tests.

Sprint 3 exit gate:

• Scene 1 (enrollment) and Scene 2 (login) work end-to-end with real biometrics, real prover, real verifier on test env.
• C-2 audit finding closed.
• Kiosk web app shippable.

Sprint 4 (weeks 9–10) — Transactions + Trusted Setup + R307 driver

Theme: Scene 3 (transaction step-up) works end-to-end. Trusted-setup ceremony executed. R307 USB-OTG driver in production.

Anchor commits:

C-163 add /v1/zkp/challenge endpoint with tx_nonce computation

• Owner: Role 6.
• Files: src/routes/v1/zkp.ts, src/services/zkp.ts, tests/zkp-challenge.test.ts.
• Test: tests/zkp-challenge.test.ts::"computes tx_nonce = Poseidon(amount, payee, ts) deterministically".
• DoD: endpoint returns {tx_nonce, session_nonce, expires_at}; writes pending-challenge audit row.
• Depends on: C-148.

C-164 mobile transaction-confirmation sheet

• Owner: Role 19.
• Files: mobile/app/src/main/kotlin/dev/zeroauth/txn/.
• Test: instrumented test asserts displayed amount + payee match server payload.
• DoD: sheet displays amount in Indian numbering format, payee name + masked account, expiry countdown.
• Depends on: C-146.

C-165 mobile prover binds tx_nonce as public input

• Owner: Role 17.
• Files: mobile/prover/src/main/kotlin/dev/zeroauth/prover/.
• Test: instrumented test generates a proof binding tx_nonce; server rejects when tx_nonce mismatches.
• DoD: prover input schema versioned; backward-compat preserved.
• Depends on: C-163, C-164.

C-166 FCM push notification for txn step-up

• Owner: Role 18 (with Role 10).
• Files: mobile/app/src/main/kotlin/dev/zeroauth/push/, src/services/push.ts (new), tests/push-fcm.test.ts.
• Test: push delivered to a registered token; payload contains only opaque txn_id, no PII.
• DoD: FCM project provisioned; per-tenant push config; revocation tested.
• Depends on: C-163.

C-167 add R307 USB-OTG driver in mobile/sensors/r307

• Owner: Role 18.
• Files: mobile/sensors/r307/, instrumented + on-device tests.
• Test: on-device test reads R307 over USB-OTG, captures fingerprint descriptor, hashes on-device.
• DoD: works on Pixel 7 + Samsung S22 with R307 sensor over USB-OTG; tested with two physical R307 units.
• Depends on: C-101.

C-168 add device-support-matrix.md tier-1 device list

• Owner: Role 4 + Role 35.
• Files: docs/operations/device-support-matrix.md.
• Test: [no-test] — markdownlint.
• DoD: tier-1 list of top-12 Indian Android SKUs by share with verified StrongBox + BiometricPrompt + USB-OTG status.
• Depends on: C-167.

C-169 execute Phase 2 trusted-setup ceremony with 6 contributors

• Owner: Role 11 + Role 27.
• Files: circuits/identity_proof.v1.2.zkey, circuits/verification_key.v1.2.json, docs/cryptography/trusted-setup-ceremony.md, circuits/ceremony-transcripts/.
• Test: tests/circuit-v1.2-verify.test.ts::"verifies one known-good proof against v1.2 vkey".
• DoD: 6 contributors named, transcripts hashed and published; ADR 0018 lands; external cryptographer review attached.
• Depends on: C-019.

C-170 add ADR 0018 for trusted-setup ceremony v1.2 transcript

• Owner: Role 11.
• Files: adr/0018-trusted-setup-ceremony-v1-2.md.
• Test: [no-test] — markdownlint.
• DoD: captures contributors, dates, transcript hashes, external review attestation.
• Depends on: C-169.

C-171 redeploy Groth16Verifier on Base Sepolia at v1.2 vkey

• Owner: Role 25.
• Files: contracts/Groth16Verifier.sol, scripts/deploy-contracts.ts, contracts/deployed-addresses.json.
• Test: verifier accepts one known-good v1.2 proof, rejects v1.1 proof against v1.2 vkey.
• DoD: deployed, verified, addresses committed; rollback contract retained.
• Depends on: C-169.

C-172 update src/services/zkp.ts to pin v1.2 vkey hash

• Owner: Role 11.
• Files: src/services/zkp.ts, tests/zkp-version.test.ts.
• Test: updated version test.
• DoD: vkey hash check passes; verifier loads on boot.
• Depends on: C-171.

Plus ~14 smaller commits (C-173 .. C-186) covering: mobile UI for R307 capture (operator-prompts), instrumented tests across more SKUs, kiosk SSE reconnect after network blip, txn-substitution demo helper toggle in operator console, more docs updates, the legal memo deliverable for Scene 4.

Sprint 4 exit gate:

• Scene 3 (transaction) works end-to-end.
• Trusted setup ceremony for v1.2 complete and documented.
• R307 driver working on tier-1 devices.
• Verifier on Base Sepolia at v1.2.

Sprint 5 (weeks 11–12) — Demo polish + Anchor Bank dry run

Theme: All six scenes integrated. Demo operator runbook complete. Internal dry run with a mock banker panel. Load test passing. Demo videoed for handoff.

Anchor commits:

C-187 add Scene 4 (breach simulation) operator console toggle

• Owner: Role 15 (with Role 9).
• Files: dashboard/src/routes/operator/breach-sim.tsx, src/routes/admin.ts.
• Test: end-to-end Playwright simulating the operator script — toggle on, run dump-users, observe table render.
• DoD: only enabled when tenant demo_breach_view_allowed flag is set; logs an audit row when invoked.
• Depends on: C-024, C-107.

C-188 add Scene 5 (audit integrity tamper demo) operator helper

• Owner: Role 14 + Role 8.
• Files: dashboard/src/routes/operator/audit-tamper-demo.tsx, src/routes/admin.ts.
• Test: end-to-end Playwright simulating the operator's tamper script.
• DoD: tampers a copy of the audit_events row in a sandbox schema, runs integrity check, displays FAIL state, restores; no production data harmed.
• Depends on: C-014.

C-189 add Scene 6 (teller workforce flow) tenant configuration

• Owner: Role 7 + Role 14.
• Files: src/services/tenants.ts, dashboard/src/routes/operator/workforce.tsx.
• Test: tenant flag workforce_enabled toggles workforce-mode features.
• DoD: workforce-mode tenant onboarding works; teller's audit rows bound to personal DID.
• Depends on: C-126.

C-190 add Anchor Bank operator runbook

• Owner: Role 35 (with Role 45).
• Files: docs/operations/anchor-bank-demo-runbook.md.
• Test: [no-test] — markdownlint + screenshot links validated.
• DoD: scene-by-scene script, the screenshots, the operator's keystroke sequence, the recovery playbook for each known failure mode.
• Depends on: C-187, C-188, C-189.

C-191 add load test sustaining 500 RPS verify for 30 min

• Owner: Role 23.
• Files: tests/load/verify-load.k6.js, .github/workflows/load-test.yml.
• Test: workflow runs nightly; reports p50, p95, p99 latency.
• DoD: at 500 RPS, p95 ≤ 800 ms, error rate ≤ 1 %.
• Depends on: C-148.

C-192 add demo-readiness Playwright suite

• Owner: Role 23.
• Files: tests/e2e/demo-scenes/.
• Test: every scene 1–6 has an automated end-to-end run.
• DoD: green on every PR before merge; gate for Phase 1 exit.
• Depends on: C-187, C-188, C-189.

C-193 record demo dry run with internal mock bank panel

• Owner: Role 45 (with Role 29 + Role 1).
• Files: docs/sales/demo-recordings/anchor-bank-dry-run-1.md.
• Test: [no-test] — markdownlint; embedded video link tested via link-check.
• DoD: full 22-min demo recorded; feedback captured; corrections tracked.
• Depends on: C-190.

C-194 update CLAUDE.md and 00-README for Phase 1 exit

• Owner: Role 1.
• Files: CLAUDE.md, docs/plan/bfsi-v1/00-README.md.
• Test: [no-test] — markdownlint.
• DoD: Phase 1 marked complete on exit-gate items; Phase 2 plan referenced.
• Depends on: C-192, C-193.

Plus ~16 smaller commits (C-195 .. C-210) covering: UI polish across kiosk + dashboard, dark-mode and light-mode demo-friendly presets, error-state polish, copy edits, the legal memo final draft for Scene 4, threat-model updates, ADR for the Anchor Bank tenant configuration.

Phase 1 exit gate (end of week 12):

• All six demo scenes pass automated end-to-end suite.
• Demo dry run complete; recording reviewed by Role 1 + Role 28 + Role 42.
• Anchor Bank tenant ready in live environment.
• Load test passes target SLA.
• No P0 audit findings open.
• Three banker meetings scheduled in week 13–14.

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Phase 2 — Pilots (weeks 13–26)

Anchor commits at milestone level. Sprint-level decomposition occurs at the start of phase 2.

Week	Theme	Anchor commits (illustrative)
13–14	First three bank demos delivered live	record three banker-feedback rounds, add bank-feedback ingestion to pain-points doc, update demo runbook with v2 of operator script
15–16	First pilot tenant goes live with limited userbase	provision pilot bank tenant in live env, add pilot-bank-specific webhook signing, add SLA monitoring dashboard for pilot tenant
17–18	SDK v1: Node	ship @zeroauth/node-sdk 1.0.0, add SDK integration tests in CI, add SDK docs site section
19–20	SOC 2 Type I evidence period kicks off	enable SOC 2 audit-evidence collector, add evidence pack auto-bundling, add quarterly access review automation
21–22	Second pilot tenant; healthcare pain-point research begins	provision second pilot tenant, add healthcare pain-points draft, add ABDM integration spike
23–24	ISO 27001 Stage 1 audit	respond to ISO 27001 Stage 1 findings, add ISMS docs to docs/compliance/
25–26	Third pilot tenant; SOC 2 Type I report received	complete SOC 2 Type I evidence, add SOC 2 report PDF to evidence pack

Phase 3 — Compliance hardening (weeks 27–39)

Week	Theme
27–32	SOC 2 Type II evidence period
33–36	ISO 27001 Stage 2 audit + DPDP §8 compliance audit
37–39	RBI sandbox application; healthcare demo specification + pilot LOI

Phase 4 — Regulator-defensible v1 (weeks 40–52)

Week	Theme
40–44	Base mainnet contract deployment + HSM-backed signer
45–48	First paid bank in production rollout (gradual)
49–50	Full disaster recovery exercise
51–52	Year-end retrospective + v2 roadmap

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Cumulative commit counter (Phase 0 + Phase 1)

Sprint	Anchor commits	Smaller commits	Cumulative
Phase 0 W1	17 (C-001..C-017)	—	17
Phase 0 W2	16 (C-018..C-033)	—	33
Phase 1 S1	8 (C-101..C-108)	12	53
Phase 1 S2	8 (C-121..C-128)	14	75
Phase 1 S3	8 (C-143..C-150)	12	95
Phase 1 S4	10 (C-163..C-172)	14	119
Phase 1 S5	8 (C-187..C-194)	16	143

Estimate: ~143 commits to phase 1 exit. Real number will vary ± 25 %. Sprint planning at the start of each sprint reconciles.

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LAST_UPDATED: 2026-05-27